THE DYNAMICS OF COOPERATION

Fouad El Ouardighi
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Fouad El Ouardighi: Logistics, Production and Service Department, ESSEC Business School, Avenue Bernard Hirsch, B.P. 105, 95021, Cergy Pontoise, France

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 01, 1-16

Abstract: In this paper, the problem of cooperation is formulated in a dynamic framework. The proposed model interrelates the process of a joint production activity involving two partners and the dynamics of a common monitoring activity of their respective contributions. Analysis of the existence of a stationary equilibrium leads to a set of predictions on the long run issue of cooperation from given initial conditions.

Keywords: Cooperation; Opportunism; Trust; Vigilance; Joint Production; Common Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000513

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