A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
Josef Hofbauer and
Gerhard Sorger
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 01, 17-31
Abstract:
The equilibrium selection model of Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), which is based on rational players who maximise their discounted future payoff, is analysed with the help of an associated differential game. Equilibrium selection results are derived for games with a ½-dominant equilibrium, for games with a potential function, and some simple supermodular games.
Keywords: Equilibrium Selection; Perfect Foresight; Potential Game; Supermodular Game; Pontryagin Maximum Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:01:n:s0219198902000525
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000525
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