FISH WARS ON THE HIGH SEAS: A STRADDLING STOCK COMPETITION MODEL

Robert W. McKelvey, Leif Sandal () and Stein I. Steinshamn
Additional contact information
Robert W. McKelvey: Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Montana, Missoula, MT-59812, USA
Stein I. Steinshamn: Centre for Fisheries Economics, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, N-5045 Bergen, Norway

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 01, 53-69

Abstract: The post-World War II era saw the development of powerful self-contained fishing fleets, so-calleddistant-water fleets(DWFs), which roamed the world's oceans, seeking out rich harvesting targets and practicing pulse fishing. With the creation in the 1980s of coastal states' extended economic zones (EEZs), to manage fisheries out to 200 miles from the shore, it was hoped that the DWFs would close down. But the ranges of many important commercial fish stocks straddle the boundaries of several EEZs, and continue out into international waters. Thus, the consequence of creating the EEZs has been to encourage development of coastal countries' national fleets, while the DWFs continue to harvest in international waters.Here, we model the fish war between a DWF and a regionally-based coalition of coastal states, operating out of their EEZs. The outcome is again a pulse fishery, but one which may be even more destructive than was the former situation, when the DWF was unopposed.Finally we point out the relevance of the fish war model to the issue of creating effective multinational Regional Fisheries Management Organisations — a necessary step for achieving sustainable benefit from the harvest of the regional seas.

Keywords: Dynamic Games; Fish Wars; Straddling Stock; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198902000549
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:01:n:s0219198902000549

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000549

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().