COORDINATION GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS

G. Schoenmakers (), J. Flesch and F. Thuijsman
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G. Schoenmakers: Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
J. Flesch: Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
F. Thuijsman: Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 02, 119-126

Abstract: We deal withn-player coordination games with vanishing actions, which are repeated games where all non-diagonal entries yield zero-payoffs, and where, moreover, at any stage beyondriany playeriloses any action that she has not used during the previousristages of play. For these games we examine the set of equilibrium rewards, where we treat the two-player case and the more player case separately. Folk-theorem like results are established.

Keywords: Repeated games; equilibrium; Folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000598

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