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STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION

Anindya Bhattacharya () and Amit K. Biswas ()
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Anindya Bhattacharya: Groupe d'Economie Mathematique et de Modelisation Appliquee (GEMMA), Universite de Caen, Caen Cedex 14032, France
Amit K. Biswas: SQC and OR Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai Center, 110 Nelson Manickam Marg, Aminjikarai, Chennai 600029, India

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 02, 165-172

Abstract: The core and the stable set are possibly the two most crucially important solution concepts for cooperative games. The relation between the two has been investigated in the context of symmetric transferable utility games and this has been related to the notion of large core. In this paper the relation between the von-Neumann–Morgenstern stability of the core and the largeness of it is investigated in the case of non-transferable utility (NTU) games. The main findings are that under certain regularity conditions, if the core of an NTU game is large then it is a stable set and for symmetric NTU games the core is a stable set if and only if it is large.

Keywords: NTU games; core; stable set; large core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000628

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