EGALITARIAN SETS FOR TU-GAMES

J. Arin () and E. Iñarra ()
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J. Arin: Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, University of The Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain
E. Iñarra: Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, University of The Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 03, 183-199

Abstract: The paper introduces and studies egalitarian sets in the context of TU-games. Those solutions follow the idea that a payoff is egalitarian if it is bilaterally egalitarian.

Keywords: Constrained egalitarianism; reduced game; consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:03:n:s0219198902000641

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000641

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