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STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTISTAGE GAMES

L. A. Petrosjan () and L. V. Grauer ()
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L. A. Petrosjan: Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Saint-Petersburg State University, Bibliotechnaya sq.2, Petrodvorets, St. Peterburg, 198504, Russia
L. V. Grauer: Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Saint-Petersburg State University, Bibliotechnaya sq.2, Petrodvorets, St. Peterburg, 198504, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 03, 255-264

Abstract: Infinite multistage gamesGwith gamesΓ(·)played on each stage are considered. The definition of path and trajectory in graph tree are introduced. For infinite multistage gamesGa regularization procedure is introduced and in the regularizied game a strong Nash Equilibrium (coalition proof) is constructed. The approach considered in this paper is similar to one used in the proof of Folk theorems for infinitely repeated games. The repeatedn-person "Prisoner's Dilemma" game is considered, as a special case. For this game a strong Nash Equilibrium is found.

Keywords: Game; equilibrium; regularization; time-consistent imputation distribution procedure; strong transferable Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000689

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