CORES OF STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH STOCHASTIC ORDERS

F. R. Fernández (), J. Puerto () and M. J. Zafra ()
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F. R. Fernández: Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa Facultad de Matematicas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012 Sevilla, Spain
J. Puerto: Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa Facultad de Matematicas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012 Sevilla, Spain
M. J. Zafra: Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa Facultad de Matematicas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012 Sevilla, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 03, 265-280

Abstract: In this paper we analyze cooperative games where the worth of a coalition is uncertain and the players only know their probability distribution. The novelty of our analysis is that the comparison among the uncertain values is done by stochastic orders among random variables. Thus, the classical concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined. This form of comparison leads to two-different notions of core. Conditions are given under which these cores are nonempty. The results are applied on three families of stochastic games.

Keywords: Cooperative games; core; stochastic orders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000690

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