TIME-CONSISTENT SOLUTION OF A COOPERATIVE GROUP PURSUIT GAME

Svetlana Tarashnina ()
Additional contact information
Svetlana Tarashnina: Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St.-Petersburg State University, Bibliotechnaya pl. 2, Petrodvoretz, Saint-Petersburg, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 03, 301-317

Abstract: In this paper we study a time-optimal model of pursuit in which players move on a plane with bounded velocities. This game is supposed to be a nonzero-sum group pursuit game. The key point of the work is to construct and compare cooperative and non-cooperative solutions of the game and make a conclusion about the cooperation in differential pursuit games. We consider all possible cooperations between the players in the game. For this purpose with every gameΓ(x0,y0,z0)we associate a corresponding game in characteristic function formΓv(x0,y0,z0). We show that in the gameΓv(x0,y0,z0)there exists the core for any initial positions of the players. The core can take four various forms depending on initial positions of the players. In a dynamic game existence of the core at the initial moment of time is not sufficient for being accepted as a solution in it. We study how the core is changed when the game is proceeding and prove that the core in this game is time-consistent. Moreover, we point out an allocation from the core which could be accepted as a reasonable one by all players. Finally, we discuss advantages and disadvantages of choosing this or that allocation from the core.

Keywords: Cooperative games; time-consistent solution; group pursuit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198902000719
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:03:n:s0219198902000719

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000719

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().