EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS

Sjur Didrik Flåm ()
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Sjur Didrik Flåm: Department of Economics, University of Bergen and Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Norway

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 04, 357-370

Abstract: Considered here are equilibria, notably those that solve noncooperative games. Focus is on connections between evolutionary stability, concavity and monotonicity. It is shown that evolutionary stable points are local attractors under gradient dynamics. Such dynamics, while reflecting search for individual improvement, can incorporate myopia, imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality/competence.

Keywords: Equilibrium problems; noncooperative games; evolutionary and asymptotic stability; gradient dynamics; concavity; monotonicity; JEL classification C62; JEL classification C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000756

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