MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITH POPULATION UNCERTAINTY

Mark Voorneveld ()
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Mark Voorneveld: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 04, 391-403

Abstract: In the games with population uncertainty introduced in this paper, the number and identity of the participating players is determined by chance. Games with population uncertainty are shown to include Poisson games, random player games, and random games. The paper focuses on those strategy profiles that are most likely to yield a Nash equilibrium in the game selected by chance. Existence of maximum likelihood equilibria is established under mild topological conditions.

Keywords: Games with population uncertainty; maximum likelihood equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000768

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