A RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA

Ruud Hendrickx (), Ronald Peeters and Jos Potters
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Ruud Hendrickx: CentER and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, Tilburg, 5000 LE, The Netherlands
Jos Potters: Department of Mathematics, Nijmegen University, P.O. Box 9010, Nijmegen, 6500 GL, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 04, 405-413

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome profiles that are not feasible as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts, we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.

Keywords: Nash equilibria; correlated equilibria; projection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1142/S021919890200077X

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