ASSESSING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF MERGERS FOR MARKET POWER

Ramon Fauli-Oller ()
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Ramon Fauli-Oller: Department de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica, Universitat d'Alacant, Campus de Sant Vicent, 03071 Alacant, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 04, 449-458

Abstract: In a symmetric setting with constant marginal costs, the welfare loss from mergers depends on the aggregate response of non-participating firms. This response in turn depends on the degree of concavity of the demand. As the degree of concavity of demand is not observable, we obtain conditions that guarantee that the premerger elasticity of demand can be used for antitrust purposes.

Keywords: Antitrust; mergers; welfare; JEL L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1142/S021919890200080X

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