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INFORMATION SHARING GAMES

Marco Slikker, Henk Norde and Stef Tijs
Additional contact information
Henk Norde: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research and Center, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Stef Tijs: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research and Center, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2003, vol. 05, issue 01, 1-12

Abstract: In this paper we study information sharing situations. For every information sharing situation we construct an associated cooperative game, which we call an information sharing game. We show that the class of information sharing games coincides with the class of cooperative games with a population monotonic allocation scheme.

Keywords: Information sharing; coopeative game; PMAS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198903000842
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Working Paper: Information sharing games (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Information Sharing Games (2000) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903000842

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