On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker
Marcel Dreef (),
Peter Borm and
Ben van der Genugten
Additional contact information
Marcel Dreef: Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Ben van der Genugten: Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2003, vol. 05, issue 02, 83-103
Abstract:
This article presents a generalization of the equilibrium analysis for the simple two-player poker game with alternate bidding of Von Neumann and Morgenstern. It approximates optimal play for this game if it is played with a regular deck of 52 cards and it discusses some strategic insights. In addition, the paper studies the relative skill level of this game.
Keywords: Poker; optimal play; skill (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S021919890300091X
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
Related works:
Working Paper: On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker (2002) 
Working Paper: On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker (2002) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:05:y:2003:i:02:n:s021919890300091x
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
DOI: 10.1142/S021919890300091X
Access Statistics for this article
International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung
More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().