Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model

Burkhard Hehenkamp

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2003, vol. 05, issue 03, 249-262

Abstract: This paper shows that, for the class ofindividualistic adjustment dynamics, unique equilibrium selection is possible in the two-population model of evolution by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993). We establish that, for generic2×2co-ordination games, the evolutionary process always selects themutation-dominantequilibrium. Though the concepts of mutation dominance and risk dominance yield different equilibrium predictions, we show that mutation dominance represents a natural extension of risk dominance that additionally captures the risk arising from the evolutionary environment.

Keywords: Evolution; co-ordination games; equilibrium selection; risk dominance; mutation dominance; stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Equilibrium selection in the two-population KMR model (2001)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001045

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