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Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities

Alex Possajennikov ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2003, vol. 05, issue 03, 291-305

Abstract: The paper considers an imitation dynamic in the context of Cournot oligopoly. The pure "imitate-the-best" behavior can lead to an outcome inconsistent with Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The paper extends purely imitative behavior to imperfect imitation in the two-stage model with capacities and prices. This variation in the imitative behavior improves efficiency and makes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium a possible outcome of the dynamic imitation process.

Keywords: Imitation; Cournot oligopoly; evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001069

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International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:05:y:2003:i:03:n:s0219198903001069