A NOTE ON NTU CONVEXITY AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES

Ruud Hendrickx
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Ruud Hendrickx: CentER and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2003, vol. 05, issue 04, 385-390

Abstract: For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out to be an important and widely applicable concept, mainly because it implies some very nice and handy properties. One of these is that every extended marginal vector constitutes a population monotonic allocation scheme. In this note, this well-known result is generalised to games with nontransferable utility.

Keywords: Population monotonic allocation schemes; NTU games; convexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001112

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