A GAME-THEORETIC TREATMENT OF A TIME-DISCRETE EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL

Werner Krabs and Stefan Pickl ()
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Werner Krabs: Department of Mathematics, Darmstadt University of Technology, Schlossgartenstr. 7, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany
Stefan Pickl: Department of Mathematics, University of Cologne, Center for Applied Computer Science, Cologne ZAIK, Weyertal 80, 50931 Cologne, Germany

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2004, vol. 06, issue 01, 21-34

Abstract: We present a game-theoretic treatment of the so-called TEM model which leads to new results in the area of time-discrete dynamical games. The presented TEM-model describes the economical interaction between several actors (players) who intend to minimize their emissions(Ei)caused by technologies(Ti)by means of expenditures of money(Mi)or financial means, respectively. The index stands for theith player,i=1,…,n.The players are linked by technical cooperations and the market, which expresses itself in the nonlinear time-discrete dynamics of the Technology-Emissions-Means-model, in short: TEM-model. In the sense of environmental protection, the aim is to reach a state which is mentioned in theKyoto Protocolby choosing the control parameters such that the emissions of each player become minimized. The focal point is the realization of the necessary optimal control parameters via a played cost game, which is determined by the way of cooperation of the actors.In application to the work of G. Leitmann [1974], but not regarding solution sets as feasible sets, the τ-value of S. H. Tijs and T. S. H. Driessen [1986] is taken as a control parameter. This leads to a new class of problems in the area of 1-convex games. We want to solve the problem by a non-cooperative and cooperative treatment. We prove that the core which is gained by cooperation of the players is nonempty and can be used as feasible set for our control problem.With this solution a reasonable model for aJoint-Implementationprocess is developed, where its necessary fund is represented by the non-empty core of the analyzed game. Steering with parameters of this feasible set, the TEM-model can be regarded as a useful tool to implement and verify a technical Joint-Implementation Program.For the necessary data given to theClearing House() we are able to compare the numerical results with real world phenomena.

Keywords: Time-discrete dynamical game; cooperative and noncooperative treatment; feasible set; TEM-model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000058

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