DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH SEMI-UNCERTAIN DYNAMICS

Simone Clemhout and Henry Wan ()
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Simone Clemhout: Cornell University, USA
Henry Wan: Cornell University, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2004, vol. 06, issue 01, 91-108

Abstract: We introduce competitive markets into an extension of the differential game model. The non-uniqueness of market-clearing prices implies the constant presence of uninsurable risks for the players. In a class of examples, some characteristics of the system as well as part of the players' rational response remain to be perfectly predictable. This offers a distinct view regarding the recent financial crises and new insight concerning institutional reform.

Keywords: Semi-uncertain dynamics; competitive markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000095

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