EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

VIABLE CAPTURE BASIN FOR STUDYING DIFFERENTIAL AND HYBRID GAMES: APPLICATION TO FINANCE

Patrick Saint-Pierre
Additional contact information
Patrick Saint-Pierre: Centre de Recherche Viabilité, Jeux, Contrôle Université, Paris-Dauphine, F-75016 Paris, France

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2004, vol. 06, issue 01, 109-136

Abstract: Viability theory can be applied for determining viable capture basin for control problem in presence of uncertainty. We first recall the concepts of viability theory which allow to develop numerical methods for computing viable capture basin for control problems and guaranteed control problems. Recent developments of option pricing in the framework of dynamical games with constraints lead to the formulation of guaranteed valuation in terms of guaranteed viable-capture basin of a dynamical game. As an application we show how the viability/capturability algorithm evaluates and manages portfolios. Regarding viability/capturability issues, stochastic control is a particular use of tychastic control. We replace the standard translation of uncertainty by stochastic control problem by tychastic ones and the concept of stochastic viability by the one of guaranteed viability kernel. Considering the Cox–Rubinstein model, we extend algorithms for hedging portfolios in the presence of transaction costs and dividends using recent developments on hybrid calculus.

Keywords: Viability; capturability; tychastic control; dynamical games; hedging portfolio (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198904000101
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:06:y:2004:i:01:n:s0219198904000101

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000101

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:06:y:2004:i:01:n:s0219198904000101