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NEW APPROACH TO THE COLLISION AVOIDANCE PROBLEM FOR A SHIP

A. Miele and T. Wang
Additional contact information
A. Miele: Research Professor, Aero-Astronautics Group, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA
T. Wang: Senior Research Scientist, Aero-Astronautics Group, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2004, vol. 06, issue 01, 137-155

Abstract: A new algorithm is developed to solve the collision avoidance problem for a host ship subject to kinematic, dynamic, and moment equations and steeredviarudder under the assumptions that the rudder angle and rudder angle time rate are subject to upper and lower bounds. The objective of the collision avoidance maneuver is to maximize with respect to the state and control history the timewise minimum distance between a host ship and an intruder ship. Two limiting cases are considered: (i) the intruder ship is uncooperative and keeps its course unchanged during the encounter; (ii) the intruder ship is cooperative. In both cases, a differential game formulation is avoided and the collision avoidance problem is formulated as a maximin problem of optimal control.Four problems are investigated and their solutions compared: Problems P1 and P2 deal with uncooperative collision avoidance, while Problems P3 and P4 deal with cooperative collision avoidance.Numerical results show that the optimal control histories always involve multiple subarcs along which either the rudder angle is kept at one of the extreme positions or the rudder angle time rate is held at one of the extreme values.

Keywords: Equations of motion; kinematics; dynamics; hydrodynamics; ship maneuvers; optimal ship maneuvers; collision avoidance maneuvers; control transformations; singularity avoiding transformations; sequential gradient-restoration algorithms; Chebyshev problems; maximin problems; minimax problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000113

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