THE WEIGHTED CORE WITH DISTINGUISHED COALITIONS

M. Cantisani and E. Marchi ()
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M. Cantisani: Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis — Conicet, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700 – San Luis, Argentina
E. Marchi: Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis — Conicet, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700 – San Luis, Argentina

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2004, vol. 06, issue 02, 239-246

Abstract: In this paper we generalize the studies of Bondareva–Shapley for a general core having weights in the definition. These weights were introduced by Billera but not used in the form as here. Moreover we study such a core with conditions of equalities for some coalitions analogously as those obtaineda posterioriin the assignment games due to Shapley and Shubik.

Keywords: Cooperative games; core; weight; distinguished coalitions; balanced collection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000174

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