STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY

Yukihisa Utsumi () and Mikio Nakayama ()
Additional contact information
Yukihisa Utsumi: Department of Value and Decision Sciences, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Meguro-Ku Tokyo, Japan 152-8550, Japan
Mikio Nakayama: Department of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45, Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan 108-8345, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2004, vol. 06, issue 04, 509-524

Abstract: In a public goods economy with linear production technologies, we consider a strategic game with coalitions in which each player is required as a strategy to reallocate his or her own initial endowments for exchange and production. Allowing negative strategies, i.e., reallocations with negative amount, we show that the core of this economy can be characterized as the set of allocations corresponding to strategy profiles for which no coalition hasa self-supporting deviation, i.e., a deviation that is not free-riding on the allocations made by the complementary coalition. Moreover, restricting strategies to be nonnegative, the classical β-core and α-core both generate precisely the core allocations of the economy.

Keywords: Public goods; strong equilibrium; self-supporting coalitional equilibrium; the core of an economy; the alpha-core; the beta-core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198904000332
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:06:y:2004:i:04:n:s0219198904000332

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198904000332

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().