CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES

Laurence Kranich (), Andrés Perea () and Hans Peters
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Andrés Perea: Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P. O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 01, 43-61

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The differences between the concepts arise from different interpretations of profitable deviations by coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general and of the weak sequential core for the case of two players. Simplifying characterizations of the weak and strong sequential core are provided. Examples highlight the essential difference between these core concepts.

Keywords: Cooperative games; dynamic games; core; differences; JEL classification: C71; JEL classification: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: Core concepts for dynamic TU games (2001)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000417

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