DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

Werner Güth, Maria Levati and Boris Maciejovsky
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Werner Güth: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany
Boris Maciejovsky: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 02, 117-135

Abstract: This paper reports on an experiment designed to explore the robustness of the deadline effect in multi period bargaining games using constant and decreasing pies, different time horizons, and constant and alternating roles. Our results indicate that decreasing pies and alternating roles lead to earlier agreements (i.e., attenuate the deadline effect) although only alternating roles significantly reduce the number of conflicts.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; deadline effect; decreasing pie (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000442

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