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SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

Steffen Jørgensen, Guiomar Martin-Herran and Georges Zaccour
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Steffen Jørgensen: Department of Organization, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 04, 395-406

Abstract: This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is established.

Keywords: Linear-quadratic differential games; cooperation; sustainability; time-consistency; agreeability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000600

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