THE DUTTA-RAY SOLUTION ON THE CLASS OF CONVEX GAMES: A GENERALIZATION AND MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES

Jens Hougaard (), Bezalel Peleg and Lars Peter Østerdal

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 04, 431-442

Abstract: This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonstrates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

Keywords: Convex games; core solutions; generalized Lorenz-maxima; coalitional monotonicity; population monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: The Dutta-Ray Solution on the Class of Convex Games: A Generalization and Monotonicity Properties (2003)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000624

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