BECKMANN'S EDGEWORTH-BERTRAND DUOPOLY EXAMPLE REVISITED

Alexei F. Cheviakov and John M. Hartwick
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Alexei F. Cheviakov: Department of Mathematics, University of British, Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z4, Canada
John M. Hartwick: Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 04, 461-472

Abstract: In the Edgeworth-Bertrand price game, each player has a capacity output, faces the same market demand, and calls out a price. The high-price caller gets some residual market at her price. The low-price caller gets her capacity at her price or all of the market. We re-work Beckmann's closed form solution to his symmetric version of this game, mostly in mixed strategies, and observe that expected price played by a player declines with the size of her exogenously given capacity.

Keywords: Bertrand duopoly; price game; Journal Classification: C72; Journal Classification: D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000648

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