UNCERTAINTY OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE

Vladislav Kargin ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 04, 517-529

Abstract: This paper defines a measure of bargaining uncertainty that quantifies Roth's concept of strategic risk. It shows how this measure can be used for checking reliability of the Shapley value in cost allocation problems and in the theory of competitive equilibrium. Salient properties of the new measure are investigated and illustrated by examples of majority voting and market games and by a cost allocation problem from epidemiology.

Keywords: Shapley value; strategic risk; bargaining uncertainty; 91A12; 91A30; 91B50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Uncertainty of the Shapley Value (2003)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000685

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