GENERALIZED CORES AND STABLE SETS FOR FUZZY GAMES

S. Muto, S. Ishihara, E. Fukuda (), S. H. Tijs and R. Brânzei
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S. Muto: Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
S. Ishihara: Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
E. Fukuda: Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
S. H. Tijs: Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
R. Brânzei: Faculty of Computer Science, 'Alexandru Ioan Cuza' University, Iasi, Romania

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 01, 95-109

Abstract: Core elements (a la Aubin) of a fuzzy game can be associated with additive separable supporting functions of fuzzy games. Generalized cores whose elements consist of more general separable supporting functions of the game are introduced and studied. While the Aubin core of unanimity games can be empty, the generalized core of unanimity games is nonempty. Properties of the generalized cores and their relations to stable sets are studied. For convex fuzzy games interesting properties are found such as the fact that the generalized core is a unique generalized stable set.

Keywords: Cooperative game; core; stable set; decision making; fuzzy coalition; fuzzy game; dominance core; convex fuzzy game; 90D12; 03E72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000801

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