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COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES

Sergio Currarini and Marco Marini
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Sergio Currarini: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia, Italy;

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 01, 111-126

Abstract: This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2003). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs of the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions.

Keywords: Coalition formation; synergies; strong Nash equilibrium; symmetric games; JEL Classification Number: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198906000813
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Working Paper: Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies (2004) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000813

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