EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH TO THE COINCIDENCE OF EGALITARIAN SOLUTIONS FOR COST-SHARING GAMES

Reiner Wolff ()
Additional contact information
Reiner Wolff: Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Fribourg, Pérolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 01, 169-183

Abstract: The pre-nucleolus is a popular egalitarian solution concept for cost-sharing games. A drawback of this concept is that an associated cost allocation often cannot be calculated in polynomial time. Therefore, it would be convenient to know whether the pre-nucleolus of a particular game coincides with the outcome of a cost-allocation method which is computationally less demanding. We provide operational conditions for a coincidence of the pre-nucleolus (point) of a cost-sharing game and the center of the game's imputation set (CIS vector). These conditions can be checked with little computational effort as compared to the potential savings in terms of computation time of a general solution algorithm.

Keywords: Cooperative games; computational techniques; egalitarianism; CIS vector; pre-nucleolus; JEL Classification Code: C63; JEL Classification Code: C71; JEL Classification Code: D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198906000850
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:n:s0219198906000850

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000850

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:n:s0219198906000850