COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

E. Fukuda (), S. H. Tijs, R. Brânzei and S. Muto
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E. Fukuda: Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
S. H. Tijs: Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
R. Brânzei: Faculty of Computer Science, 'Alexandru Ioan Cuza' University, Iasi, Romania
S. Muto: Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 03, 329-338

Abstract: In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f. game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game. For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided. Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced. For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation. It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.

Keywords: Partition function form games; compromise value; comprisable games; extensive form games (with perfect information) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000941

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