U-CYCLES INn-PERSON TU-GAMES WITH ONLY 1,n - 1ANDn-PERSON PERMISSIBLE COALITIONS

Juan Carlos Cesco () and Ana Lucía Calí ()
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Juan Carlos Cesco: Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (UNSL-CONICET), Av. Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700 San Luis, Argentina
Ana Lucía Calí: Departamento de Matemática (U.N. San Luis), Chacabuco y Pedernera, 5700 San Luis, Argentina

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 03, 355-368

Abstract: It has been recently proved that the non-existence of certain type of cycles of pre-imputation, fundamental cycles, is equivalent to the balancedness of aTU-games (Cesco (2003)). In some cases, the class of fundamental cycles can be narrowed and still obtain a characterization theorem. In this paper we prove that existence of maximalU-cycles, which are related to a transfer scheme designed for computing a point in the core of a game, is condition necessary and sufficient for aTU-game be non-balanced, providedn - 1andn-person are the only coalitions with non-zero value. These games are strongly related to games with only 1,n - 1andn-person permissible coalitions (Maschler (1963)).

Keywords: Non balanced games; cycles; transfer schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000965

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