DYNAMIC SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES

Marc Meertens (), Jos Potters () and Hans Reijnierse ()
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Marc Meertens: Department of Mathematics, University of Nijmegen, Toernooiveld 1, 6525 ED Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Jos Potters: Department of Mathematics, University of Nijmegen, Toernooiveld 1, 6525 ED Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Hans Reijnierse: Department of Economics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 03, 395-416

Abstract: This paper investigates a class of dynamic selection processes forn-person normal-form games which includes the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. For (two-person) zero-sum games and for (n-person) potential games every limit set of these dynamics is a subset of the set of Nash-equilibria. Furthermore, under these dynamics the unique Nash-component of a zero-sum game is minimal asymptotically stable and for a potential game a smoothly connected component which is a local maximizer is minimal asymptotically stable.

Keywords: Dynamic selection process; limit set; stability; JEL Classification Number: C61; JEL Classification Number: C62; JEL Classification Number: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000989

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