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UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX

Wolfgang R. Köhler ()
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Wolfgang R. Köhler: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Winterthurerstr. 30, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 03, 469-482

Abstract: I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining model. The conditions encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

Keywords: Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001028

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