THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 03, 499-514

Abstract: When the strategy set of a game is a continuum, its discretization may not conserve local properties even for arbitrarily fine strategy grids. This paper provides two technical lemmata which are useful to deal with these problems in particular contexts. Four applications are presented, regarding the discretization of Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies, a consumer optimization problem, and an insurance market.

Keywords: Discretization; continuum strategy spaces; oligopolies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001053

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