STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS

Emma Moreno-García

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 04, 533-553

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a pure exchange economy with a finite number of agents who behave strategically on endowments. A notion of strategic equilibrium with partial disposability is defined and it is shown the existence of mixed strategies equilibria. Purification results on the strategic equilibrium are obtained by considering a Walrasian endowment game with incomplete information. Finally, we obtain an asymptotic result by replicating the economy.

Keywords: Strategic equilibrium; endowment games; partial disposability; partially consumable withholdings; purification of equilibria; continuous random selection; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001090

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