EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES

Alexander Zimper

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 04, 669-674

Abstract: Moulin (1984) describes the class of nice games for which the solution concept of point-rationalizability coincides with iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. As a consequence nice games have the desirable property that all rationalizability concepts determine the same strategic solution. However, nice games are characterized by rather strong assumptions. For example, only single-valued best responses are admitted and the individual strategy sets have to be convex and compact subsets of the real line ℝ. This note shows that equivalence of all rationalizability concepts can be extended to multi-valued best response correspondences. The surprising finding is that equivalence does not hold for individual strategy sets that are compact and convex subsets ofℝnwithn ≥ 2.

Keywords: Rationalizability; dominance solutions; nice games; JEL Classification: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S021919890600117X
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
Working Paper: A note on the equivalence of rationalizability concepts in generalized nice games (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:n:s021919890600117x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S021919890600117X

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:n:s021919890600117x