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Dongsoo Shin () and Sungho Yun ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 04, 675-694

Abstract: This paper considers an agency contracting with multiple tasks. The agent is privately informed on some tasks, but he must gather information on the other. We show that depending on the cost to gather information, task assignment is employed as an instrument to induce information gathering, or as an instrument to induce a truthful report.

Keywords: Principal-agent; information gathering; partially informed agent; JEL Classification: D82; JEL Classification: L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001181

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International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

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