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E-POINTS IN EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION

Ezio Marchi ()
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Ezio Marchi: Chacabuco 218, Goday Cruz, Mendoza 5501, Argentina

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 04, 695-700

Abstract: In this paper we characterize a general existence theorem concerning E-points for n-persons extensive games with complete information. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of such E-points.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001193

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