TECHNICAL NOTE: "AN IRRATIONAL-BEHAVIOR-PROOF CONDITION IN COOPERATIVE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES"

David W. K. Yeung
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David W. K. Yeung: Department of Decision Sciences, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong;

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 04, 739-744

Abstract: Under dynamic cooperation a player may use 'irrational' acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the cooperative scheme.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:n:s0219198906001223

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001223

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