A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS

Giuseppe De Marco and Jacqueline Morgan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 02, 169-181

Abstract: In a finite multicriteria game, one or more systems of weights might be implicitly used by the agents by playing a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding trade-off scalar games. In this paper, we present a refinement concept for equilibria in finite multicriteria games, calledscalarization-stableequilibrium, that selects equilibria stable with respect to perturbations on the scalarization. An existence theorem is provided together with some illustrative examples and connections with some other refinement concepts are investigated.

Keywords: Multicriteria game; Pareto Nash equilibrium; refinement; perturbation; scalarization-stable equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001345

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