A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS
Giuseppe De Marco and
Jacqueline Morgan ()
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 02, 169-181
In a finite multicriteria game, one or more systems of weights might be implicitly used by the agents by playing a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding trade-off scalar games. In this paper, we present a refinement concept for equilibria in finite multicriteria games, calledscalarization-stableequilibrium, that selects equilibria stable with respect to perturbations on the scalarization. An existence theorem is provided together with some illustrative examples and connections with some other refinement concepts are investigated.
Keywords: Multicriteria game; Pareto Nash equilibrium; refinement; perturbation; scalarization-stable equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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