ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES

Marc Meertens (), J. A. M. Potters () and J. H. Reijnierse ()
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Marc Meertens: Fortis Corporate Insurance, Prof. Bavincklaan 1, 1183 AT Amstelveen, The Netherlands
J. A. M. Potters: Department of Mathematics University of Nijmegen, Toernooiveld 1, 6525 ED Nijmegen, The Netherlands
J. H. Reijnierse: Department of Economics Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 02, 199-213

Abstract: The paper investigates under which additional assumptions the bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set or the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which illustrates that the property 'the bargaining set coincides with the core' is not a prosperity property.

Keywords: Symmetric games; bargaining; core; JEL-Classification Numbers: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001369

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