COMPETITIVE TAX EVASION AND TRANSFER PRICES
Partha Gangopadhyay ()
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 02, 347-351
We develop an interactive model involving competitive tax evasion to determine optimal transfer prices by multinational firms. We establish that the proposed game is characterized by multiple equilibria. Implications of these multiple equilibria are examined.
Keywords: Tax evasion; transfer prices; Nash equilibria; selection of equilibrium; JEL Classification: F21; JEL Classification: F23; JEL Classification: H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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