A NOTE ON LUENBERGER'S ZERO-MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR CORE ALLOCATIONS

Jean-Michel Courtault (), Bertrand Crettez () and Naila Hayek ()
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Bertrand Crettez: L.I.B.R.E., Université de Franche-Comté, France
Naila Hayek: L.I.B.R.E., Université de Franche-Comté, and CERMSEM, Université de Paris I, France

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 03, 453-460

Abstract: In this note, we state a zero-maximum principle for core allocations, a result which was foreseen by Luenberger (1995). We prove a generalization of the first-zero maximum theorem of Luenberger. Roughly said, an allocation is in the core if for every coalition, the sum of individual benefit functions is non-positive. We also provide some partial converses which give a generalization of the second-zero maximum theorem of Luenberger.

Keywords: Zero-maximum principle; benefit functions; distributable surplus; core; JEL Classification Numbers: D51; JEL Classification Numbers: D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001527

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