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TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS

Balázs Szentes ()
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Balázs Szentes: Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 03, 483-493

Abstract: Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria are identified. All these equilibria have a surprising structure: The supports of all the mixtures that generate equilibria are two one-dimensional curves, and they surround a two-dimensional set of pure best responses.

Keywords: Simultaneous auctions; exposure problem; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001552

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