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ROBUST SOLUTION OF A TIME-VARIABLE INTERCEPTION PROBLEM: A CHEAP CONTROL APPROACH

Vladimir Turetsky () and Valery Y. Glizer
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Vladimir Turetsky: Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel
Valery Y. Glizer: Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 04, 637-655

Abstract: A planar interception problem of a maneuverable target is considered using the linearized kinematic model with variable velocities and first-order dynamics of the interceptor and target. The maneuverabilities of the interceptor and target are assumed to be variable. By using an auxiliary zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game with cheap controls of both players, an interception guidance law, linear with respect to the state vector, is derived. An analytical description of the set of initial positions (capture set) is obtained, from which this guidance law provides zero miss distance, subject to given maneuverabilities of the interceptor and target. A numerical example illustrating the analytical results is presented.

Keywords: Interception; guidance law; differential game; cheap control; capture set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001631

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