ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY

Fuhito Kojima () and Satoru Takahashi
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Fuhito Kojima: Department of Economics, Harvard University, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 04, 667-688

Abstract: We introduce the class of anti-coordination games. A symmetric two-player game is said to have theanti-coordination propertyif, for any mixed strategy, any worst response to the mixed strategy is in the support of the mixed strategy. Every anti-coordination game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, which lies in the interior of the set of mixed strategies. We investigate the dynamic stability of the equilibrium in a one-population setting. Specifically we focus on the best response dynamic (BRD), where agents in a large population take myopic best responses, and the perfect foresight dynamic (PFD), where agents maximize total discounted payoffs from the present to the future. For any anti-coordination game we show (i) that, for any initial distribution, BRD has a unique solution, which reaches the equilibrium in a finite time, (ii) that the same path is one of the solutions to PFD, and (iii) that no path escapes from the equilibrium in PFD once the path reaches the equilibrium. Moreover we show (iv) that, in some subclasses of anti-coordination games, for any initial state, any solution to PFD converges to the equilibrium. All the results for PFD hold for any discount rate.

Keywords: Anti-coordination games; best response dynamic; perfect foresight dynamic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001655

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